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Abstract
We study how inflation and deflation affect firms’ ability to cooperate in
an experimental Bertrand duopoly with differentiated products. We find that
there is significantly less cooperation in the treatments with inflation and de-
flation compared to the no-inflation treatments. The difficulties to cooperate
affect prices and welfare: Depending on the market structure, inflation and
deflation lead to significantly lower (real) prices and higher welfare.
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1 Introduction
Price setting firms typically operate somewhere between the two extremes of a per-
fectly competitive market on the one side and a monopoly on the other. Firms
benefit from achieving cooperation with the other firms in the market, that is, to set
prices above the Nash equilibrium. In laboratory markets, this type of cooperation is
typically found even in the absence of enforceable contracts and without explicit com-
munication, especially once the firms interact in a repeated setting. We study how
inflation and deflation affects firms’ ability to cooperate. The specific environment
we consider is the classical model of (repeated) Bertrand competition with differen-
tiated products in a duopoly. Here, each firm needs to take into account the price
set by the other firm when evaluating the most profitable own price. Cooperation
(i.e. pricing above the Nash equilibrium) leads to higher profits, but is susceptible
to deviations. Firms try to prevent deviations by the threat of punishment, that is
by lowering prices in future rounds.1
Critical to sustaining cooperation via the threat of punishment is the ability
of firms to detect deviations. If, for example, a firm’s competitors’ prices are not
known or known only with uncertainty, sustaining cooperation becomes difficult. In
our setup, there is no uncertainty; prices are common knowledge. But we introduce
inflation so that the overall price level changes over time. The inflation rate is
constant and there are no inflation surprises. Nonetheless, we expect inflation to
affect a firm’s price setting. In an environment without inflation, the cooperative
status quo is to not change prices. In an environment with inflation, the cooperative
status quo is to change prices regularly. In order to stay at a cooperative real price,
firms need to periodically raise their nominal price. Staying at the old nominal price
is in effect a real price deviation. The task of sustaining cooperation becomes harder.
The same is true for achieving coordination in the first place. Without inflation,
coordination can follow a simple rule of thumb: If both firms play a cooperative
1Cooperation, in a finitely repeated market, is not a Nash-Equilibrium, since there is no incentive
to punish in the last round. Nonetheless, previous experiments have shown that subjects are willing
to spend money on punishment, when there is no future interaction, and even more so in early rounds
of finitely repeated games.
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price, continue playing this price from now on. Even if non-coordinated firms played
completely randomly, they would eventually, by chance, play the same price, creating
a natural focal point to start coordinating on. Under inflation, no focal point exists
since coordination (at the same real level) requires firms to adjust prices regularly.
Given that the opponent did not raise his price by the same amount as I did, was
he deviating? Or was he trying to coordinate on a nominal price instead of a real
price? Did he fail to calculate the correct new nominal cooperative price? So, should
I immediately start punishing, knowing that this could lead to a price war we will
both suffer in, or should I allow for some mistakes by my opponent? If firms hesitate
to punish a real deviation under inflation as strongly as they would punish a real
(and nominal) deviation in the case with no inflation then sophisticated firms might
use inflation to hide some real deviations and make a higher profit that way.
We look at treatments with both positive (INF), negative (DEF) and zero in-
flation (NOINF). The treatments are identical in real terms but differ in nominal
terms. To study how the results vary with market structure, we vary the degree of
homogeneity of the product (WEAK and STRONG). This results in a 3× 2 design.
Our main result is that inflation and deflation complicate cooperation. Indepen-
dently of the market structure, cooperation is lower in INF and DEF compared to
NOINF. Some firms cooperate in real, others in nominal terms. Nominal coopera-
tion (i.e. playing the same (nominally) constant price for several periods) may be
interpreted as a sign of money illusion. Money illusion can also explain why the real
price has a slightly positive trend in DEF whereas it has a strong negative trend in
INF. However, punishment does not appear to differ between treatments. One may
expect that money illusion would make punishment harsher (in real terms) under
inflation than under deflation when subjects focus on nominal instead of real prices
but no such behaviour is observed.
Our setting allows for welfare analysis. Our measure of welfare is the utility of
the representative agent that we use to generate the demand functions. Utility, of
course, depends on prices but the relationship is neither linear nor monotone. Here,
the main finding is that cooperation by firms lowers welfare. Depending on the
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market structure, inflation and deflation may significantly raise welfare. Welfare in
the NOINF treatments is never above welfare in the INF and DEF treatment.
In a related line of research, Fehr and Tyran study the phenomenon of money
illusion. Fehr and Tyran (2001, 2008) implement an experimental market with a
large nominal shock (nominal equilibrium prices are halved in the 2008 paper and
more than halved or doubled in the 2001 paper). They find that, depending on the
direction of the shock and the strategic environment, a nominal shock can lead to
a lengthy period of adjustment before equilibrium is reached again. In contrast to
Fehr and Tyran, we implement inflation as a steady increase of the price level in
each period instead of a one-off shock. Per period, the inflation rate is 5%. We
use a standard differentiated Bertrand market setup, where the demand functions
can be derived from the utility function of a hypothetical representative consumer
Dixit (1979). Fehr and Tyran deliberately do not implement a standard market
structure because they want to avoid the effect of subjects trying to coordinate on
non-equilibrium prices. In contrast, the study of the impact of inflation onto this
coordination is our explicit goal; therefore, we stick to a model where firms can profit
from collectively playing prices above the Nash-Equilibrium. In addition, deriving
demand from first principles allows us to perform standard welfare analysis.
In a separate paper by Fehr and Tyran (2007), coordination is studied in an
experimental market where the individual payoff of a firm is given in nominal terms.
These “nominal points” are then divided by the average price of other firms to
calculate the real payoff. In this market, three Nash-Equilibria exist. Play converges
to an inefficient Nash-Equilibrium instead of the efficient equilibrium. This situation
can roughly be interpreted as one where all other firms are large and combined make
up the whole economy.2 Then, price changes by other firms can be interpreted as
inflation. In contrast to that, our firms are large within their respective market but
small relative to the economy: Inflation is exogenously given and not influenced by
decisions of the firms. Since our market only features one equilibrium, our notion of
2This interpretation does not work perfectly, since the payoff adjustment is made for each firm.
That is, for each firm, all other firms would have to form the entire economy.
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coordination failure is different from Fehr and Tyran. Whereas in Fehr and Tyran
(2007), coordination failure results from converging to the wrong equilibrium, we
define coordination failure as both firms playing different prices.
Since we use a Bertrand setting, our research intersects with the literature on
oligopoly markets. This is one of the experimentally most well studied fields of
economics. A meta study by Engel (2007) lists over a hundred different experimental
papers using Bertrand and Cournot settings. We want to study effects on cooperation
and therefore restrict attention to the case of a duopoly where we expect cooperation
to matter most. Engels reports a large impact of product heterogeneity in some cases,
therefore we include treatments with different product heterogeneity.
Duffy (2012) is an excellent survey of the experimental macroeconomics literature.
We contribute to this literature in two directions. First, we model inflation as a
steady increase of the overall price level rather than a one-off shock that raises or
lowers the value of the numeraire from one period to the next by a multiple of a
typical rate of year-on-year inflation. These one-off shocks are rarely observed in
practice. An example may be a currency changeover, but inflation, at least in the
OECD countries during the last decades, is a steady, often small increase of the price
level of around 1 to 5 percent per year. Second, we explicitly allow for cooperation
between firms and find that inflation significantly affects firms ability to cooperate.
In the last ten years, the statistical offices of a number of countries published the
firm-level data (“microdata”) underlying the consumer price indices. See Nakamura
and Steinsson (2008), Gagnon (2009), Angeloni et al. (2006), Dhyne et al. (2006)
and Bils and Klenow (2004). The main findings support the notion of earlier papers
by Cecchetti (1985) and Lach and Tsiddon (1992) that firms are reluctant to change
prices. Typically, retail prices change about once a year and services prices once
about every two years. Price increases are more common than price decreases but
this depends on the overall inflation rate and on the sectors. In section 2 we will
discuss how these findings influenced the design of our experiment.
A serious drawback of the data used in this literature is that no information
is available about the structure of the markets. Since there is no information and
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since there is no model-free way of interpreting the data (Nakamura and Steinsson
(2008)), it is typically assumed that firms operate in a monopolistic market where the
firm’s price is independent of its competitors’ prices and only influenced by aggregate
variables such as GDP, overall inflation, exchange rates and labour and other input
costs. It is this drawback that motivates us to run experiments where we can control
for the structure of a market and thus reveal insights that remain hidden in the
firm-level data of the statistical offices.
The literature pioneered by Blinder (1991), who uses surveys to explore price
setting behavior of firms, illustrates the importance of the drawback. Blinder finds
strong support that firms hesitate to raise or lower prices until other firms move
first. Fabiani et al. (2006) summarize more recent surveys conducted in nine Euro-
pean countries. The authors report that the single most important factor influencing
the decision to lower a price are a firm’s competitors’ prices. In the case of price
increases, competitors’ prices come third after labour and other input costs. These
surveys strongly support the notion that firms find themselves somewhere in between
the two extremes of a perfect competitive market and a pure monopoly and that they
do not operate in a world in which the firm’s competitors’ prices are negligible. The
surveys thus support Kreps (1990) forceful critique of the model of monopolistic
competition which is standard in the monetary economics literature and, probably
for this reason, is not uncommon in the experimental macroeconomics literature.
However, the assumption that a firm sets its price independently of its competitors’
prices is not innocuous. Inflation affects prices directly but also indirectly through
changes in the amount of cooperation by the firms. This later effect cannot be de-
tected in models which do not allow for cooperation between firms. Even in the
frictionless world of our experiment where there is no uncertainty about future infla-
tion, no menu costs, no externally imposed staggering of prices, and no informational
frictions about the behavior of a firm’s competitors, inflation and deflation have a
significant effect on firms’ ability to cooperate and thus on how inflation of the overall
price level is passed on to consumers.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the setting, and Section 3
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the experimental design and the procedure. Section 4 discusses our predictions and
Section 5 presents and discusses the results. Concluding remarks in section 6 close
the paper.
2 Setting
We consider a differentiated Bertrand duopoly proposed by Dixit (1979) with a linear
demand structure. Firms are symmetric, have zero marginal costs, zero fixed costs,
and no capacity limits. The quantities of the products are q1, q2 and nominal prices
are p1, p2. There is a competitive numeraire sector whose output is q0 and whose
price is P . Inflation is introduced by varying the value of the numeraire good. P
is normalized to 1 in the first period of the inflation treatment. The demands are
assumed to arise from the utility function of a representative consumer
U = u (q1, q2) + q0. (1)
Since this has zero income effects on the duopoly industry, we can consider it in
isolation. The inverse demand functions are partial derivatives of the function u;
thus
pi
P
=
∂u (q1, q2)
∂qi
, i = 1, 2. (2)
We make all standard assumptions that yield downward-sloping reaction func-
tions with a stable intersection. In particular, we assume that utility is quadratic,
u (q1, q2) = a (q1 + q2)− 1
2
(
q21 + 2θq1q2 + q
2
2
)
where α > 0, θ ∈ (0, 1) and we restrict prices and quantities to be nonnegative. This
utility function generates linear demand and linear inverse demand functions of the
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form:
qi =
1
1 + θ
(
a− 1
1− θ
pi
P
+
θ
1− θ
pj
P
)
, i, j = 1, 2 i 6= j
pi
P
= a− qi − θqj, i, j = 1, 2 i 6= j.
Firms choose their prices given these demand functions. The parameter θ measures
the cross-price effects and is a measure of the degree of product differentiation. When
θ = 0, the goods are completely differentiated and the firms are in effect monopolists
in two separate markets. As θ increases, the consumer is willing to substitute one
good for the other. This is a standard linear demand system that has been used in
experiments before, for example, by Dolbear et al. (1968) or, more recently, Huck
et al. (2000). Since marginal costs are assumed to be zero, the profit functions are
pii = qi (a− qi − θqj) , i, j = 1, 2 i 6= j. (3)
and the real Nash price and the real perfect collusive price are given by
pNashi
P
=
1− θ
2− θa
pcolli
P
=
1
2
a
Regarding welfare, a natural measure of the household’s welfare is its utility.3 We
assume in particular, that the representative household owns the two firms and that
the firms’ profits are his sole source of income. The budget constraint in this case
can be written as
pi1 + pi2 = q0 +
p1
P
q1 +
p2
P
q2
where pii denotes firm i’s profits. Profits can be simplified to pii =
pi
P
qi. Combining
3A different measure would be the sum of the firms’ and the consumer’s rents in the two markets.
This measure of welfare is equal to utility only if the two markets are completely separate, e.g. when
θ = 0.
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this with utility (equation 1), our measure of welfare is given by
V = u (q1, q2) .
3 Experimental Design
The setting is implemented in a computerized lab experiment. We use payoff ta-
bles depicting the payoff resulting from any price combination of the two duopolists.
Gu¨rerk and Selten (2012) show that subjects tend to be more cooperative in the
presence of payoff tables. Since we are interested in the effect of inflation on coop-
eration behavior, this is advantageous. Implementing a duopoly instead of a larger
market stems from the same reasoning. An additional advantage of not presenting
payoff formulas is to avoid barriers to participation by subjects with low math skills.4
To address possible difficulties with reading the payoff tables, we add several
control questions between the instructions and the start of the experiment.5 Addi-
tionally, we add a checker-board shading to the payoff table, which makes it easier
to spot the payoffs of symmetric strategy choices, without highlighting these over
other strategy combinations.
The market is repeated for 20 periods.6 Subjects are partner matched, that is, the
same pair of subjects plays together for all 20 periods. The instructions use a firm
framing, but are neutral with respect to the matched partner. To introduce inflation,
subjects are paid in “profit units” in each period. The exchange rate between profit
units and Euro varies in the INF and DEF treatments. All of this, including the
4An alternative way of avoiding the payoff function in the instructions would have been a profit
calculator. However, our strategy space, while finite, is large: Subjects could chose any integer
price pi ∈ [1, 40]. Using a profit calculator would add implicit restrictions on the information intake
by subjects due to limited time available to calculate price combinations. We also wanted to avoid
the implied normative effect of a payoff calculator with an automated function calculating the best
response to a given strategy of the other player.
5The experiment started when all subjects in a session had correctly answered the control ques-
tions.
6More repetitions would require enlarging the payoff tables.
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θ = 0.75 θ = 0.95
No Inflation
NOINF WEAK
(42 subjects)
NOINF STRONG
(24 subjects)
Inflation
INF WEAK
(36 subjects)
INF STRONG
(26 subjects)
Deflation
DEF WEAK
(40 subjects)
DEF STRONG
(22 subjects)
Table 1: Treatments and Number of Subjects per Treatment
(constant) rate of inflation/deflation in each period is known to subjects beforehand:
Subjects are handed the payoff tables for all periods before making their first deci-
sion.
To avoid corner solutions, we chose the payoff tables such that, in all periods of all
treatments, the Nash equilibrium price and the collusive price are strictly larger than
one and strictly lower than 40. After each period, subjects receive the following feed-
back: Their own chosen price, the price chosen by the other firm, their own nominal
payoff and the nominal payoff of the other firm.
We have six treatments. Homogeneity is either WEAK (θ = .75) or STRONG
(θ = .95), and the market has either inflation (INF) of 5% per period, deflation
(DEF) or no inflation (NOINF). Deflation is the reverse of inflation: Period 20 in
INF is period 1 in DEF, period 19 in INF is period 2 in DEF and so on. Our
treatments are listed in table 1.
While all periods are identical in real terms, the nominal prices that constitute
the Nash equilibrium strategy vary in INF and DEF. The same holds true for the
collusive price. Table 2 summarizes the Nash and collusive predictions.7
3.1 Procedures
The experiment consisted of fifteen sessions and was conducted at the laboratory
of the University of Heidelberg from July 2012 to September 2012. All recruitment
7Due to rounding, the Nash equilibrium is sometimes not unique. Similarly, the perfect collusive
strategy is not unique in period 3 of INF (period 18 of DEF).
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Nash-Equilibrium Collusion
NOINF
WEAK
STRONG
10
3
23
23
INF
WEAK
STRONG
5→ 15
2→ 4
15→ 38
15→ 38
DEF
WEAK
STRONG
15→ 5
4→ 2
38→ 15
38→ 15
Nash Equilibrium and collusive prices for each treatment.
The arrows (→) indicate movements of the nominal values
from period 1 to period 20.
Table 2: Equilibria and Collusion in Nominal Terms
was done via ORSEE (Greiner (2004)). In total, 190 subjects took part in our
experiment, 109 male and 81 female.
Subjects waited in front of the laboratory till the experiment started. While
entering, subjects randomly drew a table tennis ball which assigned them their seat
number. Matching in the experiment was tied to seat numbers. Subjects then
received the instructions, the profit tables, and after time for individual questions
the sheet with test questions. The experiment did not proceed until all subjects
had correctly answered the test questions.8 The experiment itself, as well as a final
questionnaire, were programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher (2007)). At the end of the
experiment, all subjects were called according to their seat number and paid their
earnings in private and in cash. Subjects earned on average 9.18 EUR for roughly
75 minutes in the lab.
4 Predictions
The selfish, money-maximizing prediction is playing the Nash equilibrium price of
the stage game in all 20 periods. However, it comes at no surprise that subjects try
to beat the Nash profit by cooperating with each other. Cooperation leads to higher
8In some sessions, we had replacement subjects, who also read the instruction and answered
the test questions and were to be substituted in for any subject not answering the test questions
correctly. However, this never happened. All subjects answered correctly.
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profits for both parties, but is susceptible to deviations. Therefore, we expect that,
in all treatments, some subjects will try to establish cooperation on the collusive
price, but that they will not always succeed. We predict a lower rate of cooperation
in INF and DEF compared to NOINF. In NOINF, optimal cooperation is achieved
by a pair of firms coordinating to play the collusive price of 23 for all 20 periods.
It is also possible to coordinate on values between the collusive price and the Nash-
equilibrium price.9 In INF and DEF, collusion requires subjects to frequently change
their nominal price to match the real collusive price of 23. These required nominal
price adjustments make collusion more complex. As a primary effect, cooperation
could be lower because some subjects fail to realize that adjustments are needed. As
a secondary effect, punishment might be less prevalent: Since it is not clear whether
a failure to adjust is a deliberate deviation, or a mistake due to complexity, subjects
might punish less, thus opening the door to deliberate deviations.
A slightly less profitable, but perhaps easier, way to coordinate is for both firms
to coordinate on a (nominally) constant price for several periods. To distinguish the
two, we call continued cooperation on a real price “real cooperation” and continued
cooperation on a nominal price “nominal cooperation”. Figure 1 shows some extreme
examples of real cooperation (right hand panels) and nominal cooperation (left hand
panels) from the inflation treatment. Nominal cooperation over many rounds reduces
the gains from cooperation considerably. Group 405 in the upper left panel starts
playing the collusive price and nominally coordinates on this price for most of the
experiment. Two attempts to coordinate on a higher nominal price fail, and by
period 20, they play the Nash equilibrium and achieve zero gains from cooperation.
Inflation and deflation may also affect subjects regardless of coordination. Fol-
lowing Fehr and Tyran (2001), we call this effect money illusion. If subjects use
nominal prices as a proxy for real prices, their (real) choices should have an upward
bias in the DEF treatments and a downward bias in the INF treatments.
Engel (2007) finds, for fixed partner matching, lower prices in a market with
9In principle, subjects could also coordinate to play asymmetric price combinations. However,
these lead to unequal outcomes. Given the symmetric setup of the game, a 50-50 split is a clear
focal point. Therefore we disregard the possibility of coordinated asymmetric play.
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Figure 1: Examples of play in INF
homogeneous products compared to a market with heterogeneous products. Since
we have higher homogeneity in STRONG, compared to WEAK, we expect overall
higher prices in the WEAK treatments, at least in the case of no inflation. Engel’s
results do not include inflation and deflation, but we can search for a similar difference
in our INF and DEF treatments.10
5 Results
To structure the results, we will divide our analysis into four parts. First, we will look
at cooperation between the subjects in our treatments. Here we answer the question
whether introducing inflation or deflation leads to lower cooperation. Second, we in-
vestigate whether the price level differs between treatments, and third whether price
changes differ between treatments. There, were are especially interested in how sub-
jects react to price decreases by their partners, i.e. whether and how subjects punish
10There certainly will be many reasons for subjects to set a specific price that are common to all
our treatments: E.g. some subjects might be more altruistic, some might even play randomly, and
there is a large endgame effect. When possible, we control for these in our regressions, but they are
not the main focus of our study.
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firms that deviate towards lower prices. Finally, we study whether the differences we
find for prices and cooperation affect the utility of the representative agent that we
use to construct the market demand.
We call all subjects who play an equal price coordinated on this price. However,
coordination on some price levels does not qualify as cooperation. E.g. playing the
Nash-equilibrium of the stage game is a sign of coordination, does, however, not
require any cooperation with the other firm, since playing the Nash price follows
already from pure self-interest. To differentiate cooperation from coordination, we
define cooperation as both firms playing the same price above the Nash price:
coopt =
{
1 if p1t = p2t > p
Nash
t
0 otherwise
where pit is firm i’s price in period t and i = 1, 2. Collusion is cooperation on the
most profitable price, the collusive price. Additionally, we use the dummy variable
coll first3 to describe attempted collusion. coll first3 is equal to one if a subject
plays the collusive price at least once during the first three periods, and zero other-
wise.
5.1 The Effect of Inflation on Cooperation
Figure 2 shows the levels of cooperation in our treatments over time. While the
overall rate of cooperation is 25.6%, we find considerable differences between our
treatments. In almost all periods, cooperation in our NOINF treatments is higher
than in the INF and DEF treatments. There also appears to be a strong endgame
effect, particularly in the STRONG treatments.
Table 3 shows six probit regressions. Specification (4a) is our baseline model.
In specifications (1) - (3) we look at levels alone, and then add period and period
interaction terms in specifications (4a) - (5). In specification (3) and (5) the first
three and last three periods are left out to control for possible endgame and starting
effects. In specification (4b), we change the omitted category from NOINFweak to
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Figure 2: Cooperation over time
NOINFstrong to allow for easier comparisons among the STRONG treatments.
In specifications (1) - (3), we find that cooperation is significantly lower in the INF
and DEF treatments when the homogeneity of products is WEAK. The direction of
the effect is the same with STRONG homogeneity, however, here it is only strongly
significant for the INF treatment.11 Cooperation in t predicts cooperation in t + 1
(coopt−1), as does being male, although this effect goes away when concentrating
on the middle periods. Cooperation in t is higher when a firm’s price in t − 1 is
high (p1t−1). Taking time trends into account (specifications 4a, 4b, and 5) we find
that some of the significant differences between the cases with no inflation and those
with inflation or deflation are due to different trends in cooperation. INFweak has
decreasing cooperation, compared to the case without inflation, while the time trend
is more positive for INFstrong and DEFstrong. Some of the differences between
NOINF, INF and DEF are due to different time trends, confirming the impressions
from figure 2.
Looking at the comparison between STRONG and WEAK homogeneity, we find
11DEFstrong differs from NOINFstrong at 10% in levels in specifications (1) and (3), and does
not significantly differ in specification (2).
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(1) (2) (3) (4a) (4b) (5)
period 1-20 period 1-20 period 4-17 period 1-20 period 1-20 period 4-17
VARIABLES coopt coopt coopt coopt coopt coopt
NOINFweak -0.233***
(0.0420)
INFweak -0.123*** -0.113*** -0.156*** -0.0353 -0.241*** -0.154*
(0.0374) (0.0343) (0.0520) (0.0639) (0.0374) (0.0918)
DEFweak -0.133*** -0.113*** -0.210*** -0.112** -0.286*** -0.0461
(0.0360) (0.0339) (0.0460) (0.0538) (0.0355) (0.118)
NOINFstrong -0.0729 -0.0602 -0.0188 0.390*** 0.520***
(0.0464) (0.0425) (0.0775) (0.104) (0.161)
INFstrong -0.172*** -0.153*** -0.254*** -0.0791 -0.241*** -0.121
(0.0298) (0.0304) (0.0356) (0.0619) (0.0301) (0.107)
DEFstrong -0.141*** -0.123*** -0.131** -0.0589 -0.226*** 0.0351
(0.0348) (0.0349) (0.0581) (0.0691) (0.0300) (0.157)
periodNOINFweak 0.0345***
(0.00542)
periodINFweak -0.00856* 0.0259*** -0.00297
(0.00443) (0.00559) (0.00964)
periodDEFweak -0.000639 0.0338*** -0.0195**
(0.00436) (0.00561) (0.00977)
periodNOINFstrong -0.0345*** -0.0433***
(0.00542) (0.0114)
periodINFstrong -0.0100* 0.0244*** -0.0184
(0.00513) (0.00612) (0.0113)
periodDEFstrong -0.00788 0.0266*** -0.0207*
(0.00527) (0.00626) (0.0114)
period -0.153*** -0.187*** 0.0656
(0.0463) (0.0469) (0.0510)
p1t−1 0.00601*** 0.00265 0.00540*** 0.00540*** 0.00441
(0.00170) (0.00279) (0.00176) (0.00176) (0.00286)
coll first3 0.0461 0.0835 0.0528 0.0528 0.0905
(0.0376) (0.0620) (0.0401) (0.0401) (0.0674)
male 0.0904*** 0.0687** 0.0456 0.0728** 0.0728** 0.0886*
(0.0330) (0.0286) (0.0474) (0.0301) (0.0301) (0.0488)
coopt−1 0.187*** 0.0922*** 0.155*** 0.155*** 0.0847**
(0.0258) (0.0351) (0.0258) (0.0258) (0.0355)
Observations 3,800 3,610 2,280 3,610 3,610 2,280
Log Lik -1606 -1515 -926.9 -1489 -1489 -928.4
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3: Cooperation
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a difference in the time trend for the case of no inflation, but no significant differences
for the cases of inflation and deflation.12 Overall, there is strong evidence for lower
cooperation under inflation and deflation.
Result 1a: Cooperation Inflation and deflation reduce cooperation between firms
in the experiment.
Figure 3: Real and nominal cooperation
Up until now, we considered real and nominal cooperation equally. Figure 3
shows the nominal price change between period t and period t + 1 for groups that
achieved cooperation in period t.13 We see that subjects are most likely to go for
real cooperation, that is, to adjust their price such that the real price stays the
same. However, a sizable share in both the DEF and the INF treatments keeps
their nominal price the same. The numbers above the bars show the percentage of
12Performing WALD tests in (4a), we find no significant difference between: DEFweak & DEF-
strong; INFweak & INFstrong; periodDEFweak & periodDEFstrong; periodINFweak & periodIN-
Fstrong.
13Since nominal prices are equal to real prices in NOINF, we exclude this treatment from the
figure.
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groups that achieve cooperation again in period t+ 1. We see that real cooperation
leads to a high rate of cooperation in the next period.14 Nominal cooperation works
less well, especially under inflation. While, over time, both forms of cooperation
can be achieved between the two firms in a market, the fact that both nominal
and real cooperation are chosen by subjects implies that coordination is initially
harder: Firms in a market not only have to find out whether their opposing firm
will cooperate, but also have to find out whether it will cooperate in nominal or real
terms. This additional complication can explain the lower rates of overall cooperation
we find in INF and DEF. This complication is closely related to what Fehr and Tyran
(2008) call money illusion. It is not necessary that subjects suffer from money illusion
(“individual level money illusion”) but it suffices that subjects are not sure about
whether their opponent suffers from money illusion.
Result 1b: Nominal versus Real Cooperation Under inflation and deflation sub-
jects cooperate both on nominal and on real prices.
5.2 The Effect of Inflation on the Price Level
Figure 4 shows the average real price of all six treatments over the 20 periods of the
experiment. We see, again, a clear endgame effect and a strong effect of the first
few periods of play. Under WEAK homogeneity, we see a similar downward trend
for NOINF and INF, with lower prices in INF. DEF, on the other hand, displays a
positive trend in the central periods of the experiment. This positive trend in DEF is
repeated in the STRONG treatments but there, no obvious difference between DEF
and NOINF appears. INF, on the other hand, displays a strong downward trend.
The mean price levels shown in figure 4 disguise the underlying heterogeneity
of prices. Figure 5 plots the distributions of prices in our six treatments. The
distributions typically have two modes: one close to the Nash equilibrium and one
around the collusive (monopoly) price. In the WEAK treatments, inflation and
14Given that play goes over 20 periods, a likelihood of failure of 20-27% per period could also be
regarded as high.
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Figure 4: Real price over time
deflation reduce the mass around the higher mode - confirming the impressions from
figure 4. A similar picture appears in the STRONG treatments though there the
bimodality is less pronounced. It is interesting how the distributions shift over time.
Comparing the first 10 with the last 10 periods, we see slight leftward shifts of the
distributions in INF and NOINF but a slight rightward shift in DEF. This pattern
is even stronger in the STRONG treatments. In the regressions below, the residuals
inherit to some extent the bimodality of the regressand.
In table 4, we present the regression on the price level. Specification (4a) is our
baseline model. We start with describing the non-treatment variables, which have
clear results in all specifications. Male subjects set higher prices, as do subjects who
played the collusive price during the first three periods (coll first3). Subjects who
are in a group that cooperated in t set considerably higher prices in t+ 1 (coopt).
Regarding the difference between NOINF, INF and DEF, we find a negative price
effect when moving from NOINFweak to DEFweak. In later rounds, this is counter-
acted by the positive time trend in DEFweak. INFweak and NOINFweak are never
significantly different at the 5% level in levels or trends. With STRONG homogene-
ity, the picture is reversed. DEFstrong is never different from NOINFstrong, but
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(1) (2) (3) (4a) (4b) (5) (6)
period 1-20 period 4-17 period 1-20 period 1-20 period 1-20 period 1-20 period 4-17
VARIABLES p1t p1t p1t p1t p1t p1t p1t
NOINFweak 3.481***
(1.179)
INFweak -0.768 -1.090 -0.285 -1.346* 2.135* -1.346 -1.537
(0.951) (1.058) (0.897) (0.797) (1.240) (1.020) (0.955)
DEFweak -1.799** -1.268 -4.277*** -3.136*** 0.345 -3.136** -3.355***
(0.896) (1.017) (0.889) (0.929) (1.297) (1.246) (1.125)
NOINFstrong -1.422 -0.823 -1.703 -3.481*** -3.481** -4.145***
(1.145) (1.284) (1.415) (1.179) (1.596) (1.375)
INFstrong -3.096*** -3.198*** 1.532 0.990 4.471*** 0.990 1.328
(0.896) (1.028) (1.022) (1.036) (1.404) (1.300) (1.434)
DEFstrong -1.711 -0.238 -2.819* -2.310 1.171 -2.310 -2.730
(1.125) (1.302) (1.511) (1.466) (1.728) (1.990) (1.958)
periodNOINFweak -0.158**
(0.0772)
periodINFweak -0.0460 0.0500 -0.108 0.0500 0.0532
(0.0615) (0.0583) (0.0839) (0.0754) (0.0700)
periodDEFweak 0.236*** 0.259*** 0.101 0.259*** 0.344***
(0.0661) (0.0651) (0.0895) (0.0888) (0.0878)
periodNOINFstrong 0.0268 0.158** 0.158 0.272***
(0.0808) (0.0772) (0.0994) (0.0935)
periodINFstrong -0.441*** -0.328*** -0.486*** -0.328*** -0.361***
(0.0861) (0.0826) (0.104) (0.107) (0.121)
periodDEFstrong 0.105 0.137 -0.0211 0.137 0.301*
(0.110) (0.111) (0.126) (0.150) (0.173)
period -0.215*** -0.297*** -0.139* -0.297*** -0.236***
(0.0371) (0.0341) (0.0711) (0.0448) (0.0426)
male 2.490*** 2.809*** 2.490*** 1.775*** 1.775*** 1.775*** 2.023***
(0.573) (0.648) (0.573) (0.523) (0.523) (0.472) (0.580)
coopt−1 4.152*** 4.152*** 4.152*** 4.031***
(0.492) (0.492) (0.652) (0.518)
coll first3 1.978*** 1.978*** 1.978*** 1.959***
(0.633) (0.633) (0.632) (0.718)
Constant 14.65*** 14.43*** 16.90*** 16.11*** 12.63*** 16.11*** 15.25***
(0.755) (0.835) (0.673) (0.621) (1.150) (0.750) (0.699)
Observations 3,800 2,660 3,800 3,610 3,610 3,610 2,660
R2 0.060 0.076 0.130 0.222 0.222 0.222 0.204
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Regressions 1, 2, 3, 4a, 4b, and 6: clustered over Subjects. Regression 5: clustered over Groups.
Regressions 1, 3, 4a, 4b, and 5 : full sample. Regressions 2 and 6 : periods 4 - 17.
Table 4: Price Levels
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Figure 5: Distribution of prices by treatment
INFstrong is in most specifications.15
What about the differences between STRONG and WEAK, holding the inflation
regime constant? Without inflation, we find a significant difference only when taking
the time trend into account and controlling for cooperation (coopt) and for subjects
that played the collusive price in the first 3 periods (coll first3). Under deflation,
we never find any significant difference between WEAK and STRONG, however, we
do find a difference for the inflation treatments, mostly due to a more negative time
trend in STRONG.16 That is, we find some evidence for the predicted higher price
level in WEAK, but not for our deflation treatments.
Result 2a: Inflation/deflation. Prices in the experiment are significantly higher
under deflation and weak homogeneity of products, and under inflation and strong
homogeneity of products than in the case without inflation.
15Specification (4b) is shown with NOINFstrong omitted. Results from Wald tests on NOINF-
strong=INFstrong for the other specifications are: (1) n.s.; (2) 10% ; (3) 5% in levels and 0.1% in
trends; (5) 1% in levels and 0.1% in trends.
16WALD test results for INFweak=INFstrong are: (1) 1% in levels; (2) 5% in levels; (3) 10% in
levels and 0.1% in trends; (4) 5% in levels and 0.1% in trends; (5) 10% in levels and 1% in trends;
(6) 10% in levels and 1% in trends.
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Result 2b: Weak/strong homogeneity. Prices in the experiment are significantly
higher under weaker homogeneity of products in the case of inflation, and, less ro-
bustly, under no inflation, but not under deflation.
5.3 The Effect of Inflation on Price Changes
What influences the decision to change a price? In regression 5, we look at price
changes. Our main variable of interest here is ∆p2t−1, the price change of the other
player in the previous period. An increase, after observing an increase by the other
player, can be interpreted as a reward (since a higher price raises the payoff of the
other player). Similarly, a decrease, after seeing a decrease in price by the other
player, can be seen as a punishment.
There is a significant punishing/rewarding effect in all our specifications which does
not depend on the treatment: The treatment interaction terms are never significant
at the 10% level with one exception (the interaction with DEFweak is significant at
5% in specification 5b).17 The regressor ∆p2t measures a similar, but different effect:
Punishment or reward of expected price changes. Of course, here the measurement
could be very noisy, since we do not know how well subjects’ expectations of the
opponent’s choice align with real choices. What we find is an effect of much smaller
magnitude, but in the different direction: Subjects reward price raises in the previ-
ous period, but do not reward expected price raises in this period.18 For ∆p2t, too,
there are no treatments effects (not shown).
The results for the treatment dummies confirm the impression provided by regres-
sion 4: Price trends are measured by treatment dummies here, whereas they were
measured by treatment-period interaction dummies in the regression on price levels.
17NOINFweak is the omitted category, but there is no difference in punishment among the
STRONG treatments as well. Nor is there a significant difference between the ∆p2t−1× INFweak
and ∆p2t−1 × INFstrong dummies, or ∆p2t−1 ×DEFweak and ∆p2t−1 ×DEFstrong.
18A different explanation of the result would be that subjects want to reward, but have system-
atically wrong beliefs.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5a) (5b) (6)
VARIABLES ∆p1t ∆p1t ∆p1t ∆p1t ∆p1t ∆p1t ∆p1t
NOINFweak 0.263
(0.248)
INFweak -0.00889 0.137 -0.0239 0.128 -0.0817 0.182 -0.0817
(0.0806) (0.115) (0.0856) (0.117) (0.249) (0.267) (0.334)
DEFweak 0.227*** 0.348*** 0.287*** 0.354*** 0.280 0.543** 0.280
(0.0717) (0.101) (0.0792) (0.101) (0.225) (0.262) (0.304)
NOINFstrong -0.0319 0.0847 -0.0470 0.0792 -0.263 -0.263
(0.127) (0.174) (0.131) (0.175) (0.248) (0.309)
INFstrong -0.235** -0.445*** -0.276** -0.439*** -0.992*** -0.729** -0.992***
(0.0936) (0.138) (0.114) (0.152) (0.270) (0.289) (0.347)
DEFstrong -0.0403 0.0460 -0.0168 0.0714 -0.0112 0.252 -0.0112
(0.117) (0.128) (0.121) (0.125) (0.265) (0.292) (0.359)
∆p2t−1×NOINFweak 0.0117
(0.0660)
∆p2t−1×INFweak 0.00236 -0.0199 -0.0165 -0.00485 -0.0165
(0.0776) (0.0674) (0.0622) (0.0662) (0.0709)
∆p2t−1×DEFweak 0.0981 0.107 0.106 0.118* 0.106
(0.0599) (0.0679) (0.0644) (0.0677) (0.0733)
∆p2t−1×NOINFstrong 0.0156 -0.0121 -0.0117 -0.0117
(0.0776) (0.0696) (0.0660) (0.0593)
∆p2t−1×INFstrong 0.0710 0.0365 0.0304 0.0420 0.0304
(0.0703) (0.0655) (0.0617) (0.0660) (0.0643)
∆p2t−1×DEFstrong 0.113 0.119 0.116 0.127 0.116
(0.0813) (0.0854) (0.0798) (0.0827) (0.0843)
∆p2t−1 -0.0613*** -0.135*** -0.0620*** -0.0762*** -0.0762*** -0.0762***
(0.0207) (0.0242) (0.0202) (0.0190) (0.0190) (0.0254)
male -0.0336 -0.0846 -0.0257 -0.0842 0.369** 0.369** 0.369**
(0.0568) (0.0827) (0.0603) (0.0821) (0.160) (0.160) (0.152)
p1t -0.231*** -0.231*** -0.231***
(0.0211) (0.0211) (0.0242)
∆p1t−1 -0.405*** -0.405*** -0.257*** -0.257*** -0.257***
(0.0323) (0.0320) (0.0297) (0.0297) (0.0336)
∆p1t−2 -0.214*** -0.216*** -0.131*** -0.131*** -0.131***
(0.0310) (0.0310) (0.0307) (0.0307) (0.0253)
coll first3 -0.570*** -0.571*** -0.0129 -0.0129 -0.0129
(0.102) (0.102) (0.197) (0.197) (0.192)
coopt−1 0.681*** 0.679*** 1.432*** 1.432*** 1.432***
(0.145) (0.143) (0.191) (0.191) (0.239)
∆p2t−2 0.208*** 0.155*** 0.107** 0.118** 0.107** 0.0952* 0.107**
(0.0264) (0.0274) (0.0447) (0.0475) (0.0448) (0.0523) (0.0481)
Constant -0.261*** -0.504*** -0.335*** -0.512*** 2.513*** 2.250*** 2.513***
(0.0671) (0.0870) (0.0757) (0.0891) (0.310) (0.328) (0.371)
Observations 3,420 3,230 3,420 3,230 3,230 3,230 3,230
R2 0.047 0.209 0.065 0.211 0.269 0.269 0.269
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5: Price Changes
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Regarding the other control variables, we find a downward trend when play is at
higher levels (p1t−1) - this is not surprising, since the Nash price forms a natural self-
ish lower bound on declining prices. Playing the collusive price (coll first3) during
the first three periods is significant, but only when not controlling for the price level
directly. Also unsurprisingly, cooperation has a strong positive effect on the price
trend. The result for the lagged own price changes (∆p1t−1 & ∆p1t−2) is interesting.
Price paths are not monotone, but “oscillate”: Having raised the price in one of the
previous two periods predicts not another increase but a reduction.
Result 3a: Reward and Punishment Subjects reward price increases by their
opponents and punish price decreases. This rewarding and punishing behavior does
not differ across treatments.
Result 3b: Price Paths Price paths in the experiment are not monotone, but
have a tendency to oscillate.
5.4 The Effect of Inflation on Welfare
Since we derive our market demands from a representative agent model, we can
calculate welfare as the utility of this representative agent. Naturally, utility is
correlated with pricing by individual firms but it is neither linear nor monotone
in prices. Utility is not the same as consumer surplus. Since the agent owns all
firms, firm profits relax the agent’s budget constraint and therefore his utility. What
is “good” for firms, namely coordinating on high prices, is often “bad” for welfare.
For the consumer, anything that stops firms from coordinating on high prices is good.
Figure 6 depicts the utility levels in all six treatments over time. By construction
(du/dθ < 0) utility is lower in the STRONG treatments. We, therefore, restrict
our discussion to comparisons between NOINF, INF and DEF within each level of
homogeneity. The picture is mostly the reverse of what we saw in figure 4.
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(1) (2) (3) (4a) (4b) (5) (6)
period 1-20 period 4-17 period 1-20 period 1-20 period 1-20 period 1-20 period 4-17
VARIABLES ut ut ut ut ut ut ut
NOINFweak 13.40*
(7.156)
INFweak 7.640 9.623 3.843 12.73** 26.14*** 12.73 10.71
(7.497) (8.415) (6.751) (6.309) (7.556) (8.676) (7.645)
DEFweak 14.18** 9.348 34.09*** 25.81*** 39.21*** 25.81*** 24.45***
(6.994) (7.999) (6.524) (6.863) (8.010) (9.546) (8.086)
NOINFstrong -31.15*** -35.38*** -24.19** -13.40* -13.40 -14.33**
(8.173) (9.105) (9.561) (7.156) (9.906) (6.830)
INFstrong -17.75*** -16.52** -27.98*** -23.37*** -9.972 -23.37*** -25.63***
(6.083) (6.797) (6.900) (6.239) (7.566) (8.489) (6.764)
DEFstrong -30.25*** -39.74*** -11.82 -16.00* -2.601 -16.00 -18.11
(7.666) (8.752) (9.233) (8.510) (9.492) (11.82) (12.21)
periodNOINFweak 1.478***
(0.402)
periodINFweak 0.362 -0.443 1.035** -0.443 -0.203
(0.436) (0.419) (0.432) (0.593) (0.521)
periodDEFweak -1.896*** -2.063*** -0.585 -2.063*** -2.525***
(0.474) (0.471) (0.496) (0.668) (0.613)
periodNOINFstrong -0.663 -1.478*** -1.478** -1.677***
(0.463) (0.402) (0.568) (0.389)
periodINFstrong 0.975** 0.0828 1.561*** 0.0828 0.323
(0.464) (0.427) (0.457) (0.605) (0.509)
periodDEFstrong -1.755*** -1.959*** -0.481 -1.959** -2.538**
(0.602) (0.598) (0.617) (0.848) (1.061)
period 1.793*** 2.386*** 0.908*** 2.386*** 1.763***
(0.285) (0.265) (0.312) (0.375) (0.310)
male -15.91*** -18.60*** -15.91*** -10.87*** -10.87*** -10.87*** -12.67***
(4.104) (4.662) (4.107) (3.657) (3.657) (3.297) (4.089)
coopt−1 -31.24*** -31.24*** -31.24*** -31.07***
(3.555) (3.555) (4.857) (3.759)
coll first3 -13.45*** -13.45*** -13.45*** -13.88***
(4.568) (4.568) (4.473) (5.184)
Constant 450.2*** 452.8*** 431.3*** 437.4*** 424.0*** 437.4*** 446.7***
(5.807) (6.570) (5.186) (4.750) (6.302) (6.234) (5.214)
Observations 3,800 2,660 3,800 3,610 3,610 3,610 2,660
R2 0.196 0.237 0.247 0.364 0.364 0.364 0.372
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Regressions 1 2 3 4a 4b 6: clustered over Subjects Regression 5: clustered over Groups
Regressions 1 3 4a 4b 5 : full sample Regressions 2 and 6 : periods 4-17
Table 6: Utility
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The utility regressions are presented in table 6. Our main specification is (4a).
As above, we change the omitted category in (4b). (5) and (6) are robustness checks,
with clustering on group instead of subject level and only the middle periods respec-
tively. In the control variables, we see a clear effect for male firms (male), cooperating
firms (coopt) and firms who initially play the collusive price (coll first3). All three
lower utility.
In the WEAK treatments, we find a mostly significant higher utility for the case of
deflation. This effect is significant in all specifications apart from (2) and, due to the
negative time trend, especially strong in the initial periods. The effect for inflation
is less robust. We do find a significantly (5%) lower utility in our main specification,
but not in specifications (1) and (2) nor in specifications (5) and (6). The picture is
similar in the STRONG treatments. There, however, it is the INFstrong treatment
that is significantly different from the NOINF case, due to its positive time trend.19
DEFstrong, on the other hand does not significantly differ from NOINFstrong.
Result 4a: Welfare Deflation coupled with weak homogeneity of products, and
inflation, coupled with strong homogeneity, raise welfare in the experiment compared
to no inflation.
Result 4b: Welfare and Cooperation Successful cooperation by firms lowers wel-
fare in the experiment.
6 Conclusion
We report results from an experimental Bertrand duopoly with differentiated prod-
ucts where firms are exposed to inflation and deflation. Our main result is that infla-
19Wald tests for INFstrong = NOINFstrong in levels and trends in specifications: (1) 5% in
levels; (2) 5% in levels; (3) n.s. in levels, 1% in trends; (4) n.s. in levels, 1% in trends; (5) n.s. in
levels, 5% in trends; (6) n.s. in levels, 1% in trends.
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Figure 6: Utility over time
tion complicates cooperation. Independently of the market structure, cooperation is
lower in INF and DEF compared to NOINF. Interestingly, some firms cooperate in
nominal instead of real terms. This may be interpreted as a sign of money illusions.
Money illusion can also explain why real prices have a slightly positive trend in DEF
whereas they have a strong negative trend in INF. Punishment does not appear to
differ between treatments. Using utility as a measure of welfare, we find that coop-
eration by firms lowers welfare. Depending on the market structure, inflation and
deflation may significantly raise welfare. Welfare in the NOINF treatments is never
above welfare generated in the INF and DEF treatment.
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